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This paper examines the impact of receiving a new stadium on team franchise values.  I
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playing in its own stadium has a higher franchise value than a team playing in a public stadium. 
However, the difference in franchise values between playing in a team-owned stadium and
playing in a public stadium does not offset the average cost of constructing the stadium.  The
paper thus provides a deeper understanding the determinants of franchise values and of the
motives of sports team owners in their lobbying efforts for public subsidies.
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1.  Introduction 
 
During the 1990’s, many teams in the four major American sports had new 
stadiums or arenas constructed.  In 1990, the average Major League Baseball (MLB) 
ballpark was almost 34 years old and only 2 of 26 teams (Toronto and Minnesota) played 
in ballparks that were less than 10 years old.  By 2002, the average park was only 24 
years old and 12 of 30 teams played their home games in stadiums that were 10 or fewer 
years of age and 4 other teams played in stadiums that were 15 or fewer years of age.  By 
2004, three other teams (Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and San Diego) were playing in new 
stadiums and one other team (St. Louis) was having a new stadium built.  In most cases, 
the construction costs of these new stadiums were financed with various sources of public 
funds.   
The 1990’s also saw an increase in research into the effects that sports teams and 
sports stadiums have on local and regional economies.  Some of this research was 
commissioned by the teams themselves.  Typically, as part of a formal request for public 
funds, team owners commission so-called “economic impact” statements to quantify the 
effect that a new stadium will have on the host city’s economy.  Not surprisingly, these 
statements claim that the construction of new stadiums generate millions of dollars of 
economic output and hundreds of jobs in the host cities and regions. 
  For an example of such a claim, a consultant calculated that the construction of a 
new National Football League (NFL) stadium in Arlington, Texas, will have a one-time 
impact of over $71 million (using 2010 dollars) and will support 457 jobs in the city of 
Arlington alone (Economic Research Associates, 2004).  For Tarrant County, the   4
estimated one-time impact of the construction of the stadium exceeds $348 million and 
2,222 jobs.  The report also states that Arlington will realize an average annual impact of 
over $155 million in output and 226 jobs from the day-to-day operations of the stadium 
while Tarrant County will realize an average annual impact of almost $280 million in 
output and 983 jobs.   
Independent analysts, on the other hand, are skeptical about such claims.  For 
example, studies by Baade and Dye (1990), Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, and 
Mullins (1994), and Baade (1996) find that sports teams and their stadiums, on average, 
do not provide significant impacts on local or regional economies although they find 
some small impacts in some cities.  Baade and Dye (1990) find a significant negative 
effect on the host cities’ regional share of income and their regional share of retail sales 
in cities that had baseball stadiums built or renovated between 1965 and 1983.  
Furthermore, Coates and Humphreys (1999), examining the 37 cities in the United States 
with National Basketball Association (NBA), NFL, or MLB teams, find that the existence 
of these teams is negatively correlated with the level of real per capita income in a city.  
Coates and Humphreys (2000) examine specific industries within the same set of 37 
cities as their 1999 paper and find that the presence of a sports team is associated with 
increased levels employment and earnings in the amusement and recreation sector.  The 
presence of a sports team, however, is associated with decreased employment and 
earnings in all other sectors by an amount that offsets the increase in the amusement and 
recreation sector.  This suggests that spending on sports teams in a metropolitan area 
mostly represents spending that is merely redistributed within the area’s economy.  This 
explains the overall findings in their 1999 paper.   5
The independent evidence suggests two items.  First, it suggests that, at best, the 
economic impact statements examine the benefit side of the issue and, thus, are 
measuring gross impacts on output and employment.  A complete economic impact 
statement would measure both the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of sports 
teams and sports stadiums.   
Second, the existence of sports teams and stadiums in a metropolitan area causes 
consumers to redistribute their spending within a metropolitan area.  At worst, it can 
actually decrease earnings and employment in their metropolitan areas.  Hence, neither 
the existence of sports teams nor the construction of sports stadiums provide a catalyst for 
economic development in terms of employment and output growth. 
But teams continue to put forth effort to secure financing for new sports stadiums, 
suggesting that playing in a new facility improves the value of a franchise.  Alexander 
and Kern (2004) find evidence for this effect for MLB, NBA, and National Hockey 
League (NHL) teams.   
This paper adds to the literature on public financing for sports stadiums and the 
effect of new stadiums on franchise values in two ways.  First, it specifically examines 
the effect of private financing for new stadiums on team franchise values.  While 
Alexander and Kern examine the effect of playing in new stadiums on franchise values, 
they do not account for the public/private share of construction costs – implicitly treating 
publicly funded and private funded stadiums equally.  Moreover, since the existing 
literature does not contain such an analysis, it is not clear how or if, all else equal, a 
team’s franchise value differs when it plays in a publicly funded stadium compared to 
when it plays in a privately funded stadium.  This study attempts to clarify this issue.    6
Second, Alexander and Kern examine the effect of a new facility on team 
franchise values through the use of a dummy variable.  Presently, I measure the impact of 
the age of a team’s home stadium on its franchise value – a more accurate measure of the 
“newness” of a facility.  Overall, by examining the effect of a stadium’s age and its 
public/private financing proportions, this paper provides a deeper understanding of the 
determinants of franchise values and the motives underlying the lobbying efforts of 
professional sports team owners in seeking public subsidies. 
Using panel data from MLB during 1990-2002, I find evidence that the receipt of 
a new stadium enhances franchise values and privately constructing and owning a 
stadium further enhances franchise values.  However, the increase in franchise value due 
to private construction and ownership does not fully cover the cost of constructing the 
stadium. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the theory.  
Section 3 presents the empirical model and section 4 describes the data.  Section 5 
presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theory 
 
The value of a franchise in period “t” measures its potential selling price in that 
period.  For brevity, I refer to the current ownership group as “owner.”  Suppose the 
owner and prospective buyer are negotiating over the sale price of a team.  Both seek 
maximum profits and both have perfect foresight
i.  The owner would not rationally 
accept less than the present value of the team’s future profit stream and the prospective   7
buyer would not rationally pay more than the present value of the team’s profit stream.  If 
the owner and prospective buyer discount future returns at the same rate and the revenues 
and costs are the same under either ownership group, the sale price of the franchise 
equals the present value of its profit stream.  Under the assumptions, the team’s franchise 
value measures the present value of its profit stream.   
If profits accrue continuously, team i’s franchise value in period t is given by 
() dt e L V C R Franchval
rt
t ti ti ti ti ti
− ∞
= ∫ − + − =
0 δ α .                                                                 (1) 
ti R  is the gross revenue generated by the team in year t and  ti C  represents the operating 
costs of running the team in year t.  A team’s operating costs includes items such as 
player and coach payroll, scouting expenses, player development expenses, and general 
and administrative expenses.  r is the rate at which the owner and the prospective buyer 
discount the future.   0 = t  is the current period.   ti V  is the value of the building in which 
the team plays and α  is a parameter that represents the ownership of the stadium.  I 
assume, for simplicity, that α  is a binary variable:  if the team owns the stadium, then 
1 = α .  If the team does not own the stadium, then  0 = α
ii.   ti L  represents a lease 
payment made to the owner of the stadium and δ  is a binary variable that represents 
whether the team leases the stadium
iii.  If the team owns the stadium, then  0 = δ  and it 
has no lease payment.  If the team does not own the stadium, then  1 = δ  and the team 
incurs a lease payment of  ti L δ .  
Suppose the team will receive a new stadium in some future period  1 + n .  
Rewrite equation (1) as follows:    8
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The first expression on the right-hand side,  () dt e L V C R
rt n
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0 δ α , represents the 
future profit stream in the old stadium.  The second expression on the right-hand side, 
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' ' ' δ γ α , represents the future profit stream in the new 
stadium.  
'
ti V  is the value of  new the building and 
' α  is a binary parameter that 
represents the ownership status of the new stadium and is defined as α  is defined above.  
' δ  and 
'
ti L  collectively represent the team’s lease payment in the new stadium and are 
defined as δ  and  ti L  are defined above.   ti B  represents the total costs of building a new 
stadium and γ  represents the proportion of the construction costs, including interest 
payments, borne by the team
iv.  Therefore, ( ) ti B γ − 1  represents the total value of the 
public construction subsidy
v. 
A new stadium will enhance the revenues
vi and operating costs generated by the 
home games played by the team.  There will be a “newness” associated with the stadium 
that will draw people who otherwise would not attend the team’s home games.  Team 
revenues will also be enhanced because new stadiums include amenities that people find 
valuable – for example, wider aisles, newer restroom facilities, more comfortable seats, 
better sightlines for fans, and a retractable roof.  The new stadium and its amenities 
increase the demand for the team’s games which, in turn, enhance team revenues.   
Quirk and Fort (1992) argue that if stadium construction is publicly subsidized, 
this may lead to “gold plating” – including amenities whose marginal private costs   9
exceeds its marginal private revenues (for example, marble walls and gold-plated 
hardware in the bathrooms).  If the stadium is publicly subsidized, the team may not fully 
account for the costs of providing the amenity.  If so, the revenues generated by publicly 
financed stadiums may be even higher than in privately financed stadiums.   
The new stadium will also increase the overall costs of operating the team.  Since 
the demand for the team’s games will increase, the demand for playing skills will be 
enhanced, translating into higher payroll for the team.  But it will also enhance the value 
of scouting and player development, though to a lesser extent than it enhances the value 
of playing skills.  Ticket operations would incur higher costs since the new stadium will 
increase the demand for the team’s games.  Lastly, since building a new stadium 
generates fan interest, the team would want to capitalize on this initial boost by further 
marketing and publicizing the team and the new stadium.  Overall, regardless of the 
financing mechanism, the new stadium should enhance the team’s profitability since no 
rational profit-maximizing owner would want a new stadium that would increase the 
team’s costs more than its revenues. 
Now turn to the costs of construction borne by the team owner.  If the 
construction of the stadium is 100% privately financed, then  1 = γ .  Private financing can 
come either from the team itself or via a loan secured from some private interest.  If the 
owner pays for the new stadium without securing a loan, then it incurs the construction 
costs and an opportunity cost associated with using its own funds to construct the 
stadium.  If the owner secures a loan from another private source, the owner is 
responsible for repayment of the principal and the interest payments.  In either case, the 
owner will incur the construction costs and explicit or implicit debt financing.  In return,   10
the owner will possess the stadium and will be able to capture the value of the building in 
the team’s franchise value.  If  ti ti B V >
' , then ownership of the building will enhance the 
value of the franchise. 
Now suppose that the construction of the stadium is publicly subsidized so that 
1 < γ .  As γ  falls, the construction costs borne by the owner also fall.  But as  0 → γ , the 
likelihood that the team will possess the building falls.  If the public owns the new 
stadium ( 0 '= α ) but the team pays some of the costs of construction ( 0 > γ ), then the 
portion of the team’s franchise value generated in the new stadium from equation (2) is 
[] () dt e L B C R
rt
n ti ti ti ti
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' ' δ γ .  Consequently, all else equal, a publicly-owned new 
stadium will give the owner a lower franchise value when the owner bears some of the 
construction costs.  If the stadium is publicly funded and publicly owned, then 0 '= α  and 
0 = γ .  The portion of the franchise value generated in the new stadium becomes 
[] () dt e L C R
rt
n ti ti ti
− ∞
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' ' δ .   The franchise value of a team in such a situation will be 
higher than if it finances some of the construction, but it will be lower than a team 
playing in a privately-financed and privately-owned stadium. 
In summary, new stadiums will increase the demand for the team’s games and 
thus generate new revenues for the home team - regardless of the financing mechanism.  
The operating costs of teams with new stadiums will also be higher given that the 
increased demand for games will generate higher operating costs as well.  Consequently, 
we expect that the franchise values of teams with new stadiums will be higher than those 
with older stadiums, regardless of how construction is financed.  Furthermore, private   11
ownership of the building will enhance the franchise value, but whether it increases 
franchise values sufficiently to warrant 100% private financing is an empirical question. 
 
3.  Empirical Models 
 
The basic empirical model that I examine takes the form of   
ε γ β + + = PRIV X franchval ln                                                                                      (3) 
where  franchval ln  is a vector of the logarithms of real franchise values (base year = 
2001), X  is a matrix of independent variables that impact team franchise values and 
PRIV is a matrix of variables that control for the financing and ownership of the stadium. 
β  and γ  are vectors of parameters to be estimated.  ε  is a vector of random error terms.   
I include the logarithm of SMSA real per-capita income and the logarithm of 
SMSA population in each team’s home metropolitan area.  SMSA per-capita personal 
income and population both control for the drawing potential of baseball in the home 
team’s SMSA.  They thus control for team revenues and, through the demand for baseball 
talent, team costs.  A positive and significant estimated coefficient on each suggests they 
positively impact profits and thus have a greater impact on revenues than costs.   
In the X matrix, I include team winning percentage in the current year in the 
regressions.  A higher team quality will provide more utility to fans and would, therefore, 
increase team revenues.  However, since quality is costly to obtain, the team winning 
percentage measures will also control for costs.  A positive and significant coefficient on 
team winning percentage suggests that its effect on revenues exceeds its effect on costs.   12
I also include the winning percentage from the prior season in each regression.  
This is an indicator of the current year’s expected quality and is an important component 
in determining ticket prices, season ticket sales, early season tickets sales, media 
revenues, and advertising prices.  It is also an indicator of the costs associated with 
players who remain on their teams from year to year.  A positive and significant 
coefficient suggests that a better performance in the previous season leads to higher 
revenues than costs and, therefore, a higher franchise value in the current season. 
I include the age of the stadium as a regressor in quadratic form.  Age is defined 
as the number of years between the current season and the year the park opened.  For 
example, if a particular observation is drawn from 1996 and the park opened in 1992, 
then age = 4 for that observation.  If age = 0, then the team is playing in a brand new 
stadium.   
The expected signs on the estimated coefficients depend on whether the stadium 
is a new stadium or an old stadium.  A new stadium presents a novelty that will draw 
people in its initial years who otherwise would not have attended games.  But this novelty 
should diminish over time.  Consequently, I expect that team revenues will fall as a 
stadium ages.  For these teams, since the operating costs should not change much as the 
stadium gets older, I expect that franchise values will fall as the age of the stadium 
increases. 
Many of those who are attracted by the novelty of having a new stadium, 
however, will stop attending games in the future.  But we expect those who continue to 
attend games over time will be those that, by and large, are not drawn to games because 
of the stadium but because of the game on the field.  Consequently, I expect that revenues   13
will fall at a diminishing rate for teams in new stadiums.  Since the operating costs 
associated with a new stadium will not change much in the early years of stadiums, I 
expect that franchise values of teams playing in new stadiums will fall at a decreasing 
rate.  Therefore, I expect the coefficient on the quadratic effect of stadium age will be 
positive for teams playing in new stadiums. 
In the PRIV matrix, I include an ownership dummy equal to one for teams 
playing in stadiums owned by that team.  I also include two interactions.  I include an 
interaction between the age of the stadium and the proportion of stadium construction 
that was privately financed and an interaction between the ownership dummy and the age 
of the stadium.  I also include quadratic terms for these dummies to control for different 
impacts over time with respect to these variables. 
Lastly, I included year-specific dummies in each model to control for any year-
specific impacts not captured by any other variable.  2002 is the reference year. 
 
4.  Data 
 
To empirically examine the impact of public financing on sports franchise values, 
I present evidence from MLB during the period 1990 – 2002.  I obtained SMSA per-
capita personal income and population for the study from the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Regional Economic Information System (REIS).  I obtained information on 
most stadiums, including the construction costs and public financing information, from 
Munsey and Suppes’ www.ballparks.com.  I supplemented this information with data 
from www.ballparksofbaseball.com and in personal correspondence with Rod Fort.      14
Financing information was not available for the Skydome in Toronto.  In addition, 
I had incomplete macroeconomic data for Toronto and Montreal, so those teams were not 
included in the empirical analysis.   
I obtained franchise values for each team, published initially in Financial World 
and then in Forbes, from Rod Fort’s website at 
http://www.rodneyfort.com/SportsData/BizFrame.htm.  As Alexander and Kern (2004) 
note, the true market value of a franchise is only observed when the franchise is sold.  
The franchise values published by Financial World and Forbes are thus estimates of the 
true market value of teams.  The estimates are generated from surveys administered to 
teams to measure their revenues, costs, and thus their profits.   Thus, they argue, the 
estimation of team franchise values represents reasonable attempts to ascertain the true 
market value of a team.  Alexander and Kern also note that when a team is actually sold, 
its selling price is typically above the franchise value found in the Financial World-
Forbes data - discrepancies that Alexander and Kern suggest are possible evidence of the 
winner’s curse.   
Indeed, from 1990-2002, there were 16 sales involving US baseball teams that 
represented 100% transfers of team assets to new owners or that didn’t include the sale of 
a regional sport network.  Over half of these 16 sale prices (9) were within 20% of the 
estimated franchise values and 4 more were within 25.4% of the estimated franchise 
values.  Of these 13 sales, 9 of the sale prices were above the estimated franchise 
values
vii.  While not perfect, these estimates of team franchise values are reasonable 
measures of the true franchise values of teams and I take the discrepancies between actual 
sale prices and estimated franchise values as being within a reasonable difference.     15
 
5.  Empirical Results 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present the MLB teams that were in existence in 1990 and the 
home stadiums in which they played in 2002.  Table 1 contains the information for teams 
that did not have new stadiums built during the period and Table 2 contains the 
information for teams that did have new stadiums built during that time.  While playing 
in publicly financed stadiums is not new, there was only one new stadium that was built 
during the 1990-2002 period whose construction was not publicly funded – the San 
Francisco Giants‘ stadium – while three of the old stadiums were privately funded when 
originally constructed (Yankee Stadium, Wrigley Field, and Fenway Park).  While 
private funding used to be the norm back in the early 1900’s, it is the exception now.   
In real 2002 dollars, the parks that opened during the 1990-2002 period that were 
completed before 1999 averaged approximately $211.3 million in cost.  Those that were 
completed during and after 1999 averaged $345.37 million – 63.5% higher than those 
completed before 1999.  The Producer Price Index for the “non-residential business” 
building industry increased by just over 20% from 1990 to 2002.  The increase in stadium 
construction cost outpaced the PPI for non-residential business builders by almost 45 
percentage points. 
Tables 1 and 2 also present evidence that teams have run into more barriers when 
requesting public funds:  from 1962 to 1982, the average public financing proportion of 
construction costs was 89% (97% when excluding Dodger Stadium).  For stadiums built 
in the US since 1990, the public financing proportion fell to just over 68%.   16
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
examination.  Table 4 presents the regression results performed on the logarithm of real 
franchise values.  I estimated five separate regressions, each differing in the manner in 
which private financing and ownership information was entered into the model.  In model 
1, I only control for private financing.  In model 2, I control for private ownership of the 
stadium through an interaction term between the private ownership dummy and the age 
of the stadium.  In model 3, I add in a quadratic term for the ownership-stadium age 
interaction effect.  In model 4, I add in a dummy = 1 for each team that plays in a stadium 
that is at least partially owned by the team.  In model 5, I take out the interaction terms. 
I tested each model for the presence of random effects using the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier (1980) test for random effects.  Each model exhibited the presence 
of random effects.  I then performed a Hausman (1978) test to test for orthogonality 
between the individual effects and the regressor.  I found no presence of orthogonality.  
The results of the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests are given at the bottom of each 
column in Table 4.  Lastly, I performed a Wooldridge (2002) test for an AR1 process and 
found that each model exhibited first-order autocorrelation.  I performed all regressions 
with STATA and I estimated a random effects AR1 model in each case.   
The between, within, and overall R-squares are given at the bottom of each 
column in Table 4.  The overall R-squares are all above 0.70 and the within R-squares are 
just below 0.80 or above, suggesting a good fit for the random effects models.   
The coefficients on the logarithm of real per-capita income are insignificant in 
each model suggesting that the changes in real per-capita income do not significantly 
affect real franchise values.      17
The estimated coefficients for the logarithm of SMSA population are positive and 
significant in each model.  The coefficients suggest that a 1% increase in the SMSA 
population increases team franchise values by between 0.093% and 0.121%.  So, for a 
franchise valued at $200,000,000, a 1% increase in its SMSA’s population would lead 
approximately to a $200,000 increase in the team’s franchise value. 
The coefficients on team winning percentage and lagged team winning percentage 
are positive and highly significant in each model.  Those for the current team winning 
percentage are higher than their respective estimates for lagged winning percentage, 
suggesting that the current year’s team quality is more important in terms of franchise 
value growth than last year’s team quality.  Regarding the previous year’s team quality, 
fans generally use the performance of a team in one season as an indicator of how next 
year’s team will perform.  If it performs well, fans expect the team to do better in the 
subsequent season (all else equal), and the demand for team’s games increases.  Teams, 
realizing this, set the prices of their products (tickets, broadcast rights, etc.) accordingly.   
In every model, the coefficients on stadium age are negative and significant.  The 
coefficients in each models’ quadratic stadium age term is positive but not significant.  
Therefore, when a team receives a new stadium, it receives a boost in its franchise value 
regardless of how the venue is financed.  However, as the stadium ages, all else equal, the 
franchise value decreases.  Moreover, the results are robust for both regressors across the 
models.   
None of the coefficients on the age of the team, the years of the team in the city, 
or their quadratic terms are significant.  These results, coupled with those on the age of 
the stadium described above, suggest that fans generally do not account for how long the   18
team has been in the city or how old the team is when they make their consumption 
decision regarding the team.  But they do account for how old the stadium is.  These 
effects are accounted for in the team’s franchise value. 
The time dummies d1990 to d1999 are negative and highly significant in every 
model while those on d2000 to d2001 are insignificant in every model.  Moreover, the 
coefficient estimates for each time dummy are consistent in terms of their values and 
mathematical signs across models.  Since 2002 is the reference year, the results suggest 
that team franchise values increased from 1990 to 1999, but leveled off from 2000 to 
2002.  Moreover, in each model, the estimates of the time dummies decreased from 1990 
to 1994, remained relatively steady in 1995, and then began to increase again until 
leveling off starting in 2000.  1990 to 1993 was the time during which baseball came out 
of its labor market collusion period while 1994 and 1995 were the years that were 
affected by the players’ strike.  The results suggest that franchise values began to recover 
from the effects of the strike in 1996.  These results are consistent with the findings of 
Schmidt and Berri (2004) who find that demand shocks associated with labor disputes, at 
least in Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League, and the National Football 
League, are transitory and disappear soon after the dispute ends. 
Now we turn to the private financing and private ownership effects.  The 
coefficients on the stadium age – public financing proportion interactions are 
insignificant in every model.  The coefficients on the quadratic terms present mixed 
results.  In models 1, 2, and 5, the coefficients are negative but insignificant.  In models 3 
and 4, the coefficients are positive and significant at the 5% level of significance.     19
The coefficients on the ownership controls also show some mixed results.  When 
the stadium age – private ownership interaction is included linearly (regression 2), its 
coefficient is negative but insignificant.  When the quadratic term is entered into the 
regression (regression 3), the linear term becomes positive and highly significant, 
suggesting that an omitted variables problem existed in regression 2 with respect to the 
linear term.  The coefficient on the quadratic terms is negative in both models and highly 
significant.  It is also in these two models that the stadium age – private financing 
proportion quadratic coefficient is significant.  The results in regressions 3 and 4 suggest 
that, as the stadium ages, if a team owns a stadium, all else equal, the team’s franchise 
value increases.  As the stadium ages, teams that built stadiums at least partially with 
private financing are paying off any debt associated with the construction costs.  
Moreover, since interest payments are higher earlier in the term of a loan, as the stadium 
ages, the team is paying off more and more of the principal, and thus gaining more 
“ownership” of the stadium.  But at the same time, as the stadium itself ages (regardless 
of the financing mechanism), the team’s franchise value is falling, offsetting the effect on 
private ownership. 
Lastly, in models 4 and 5, I include a dummy for private ownership.  The 
coefficient on this dummy is positive and insignificant in both models. 
Figures 1 and 2 show results from calculating predicted real franchise values for 
the “average team” playing in stadiums of various ages in order to examine the effect of 
increasing age on team franchise values holding all other values constant.  The average 
team is the team with the average values of the various statistics used in the regressions.  
We assume that the franchise value is referenced to 2002 (all time dummies are assumed   20
equal to zero).  I calculated predicted values using model 3 from table 4 for two types of 
stadiums:  private and public and I assumed that if the team plays in a public stadium, it 
provided no funds towards that stadium’s construction.  If the team plays in a private 
stadium (i.e. it owns the stadium), then it financed 100% of its construction costs.  Figure 
1 shows the undiscounted estimated franchise values for a public stadium at various ages 
(dashed line) and the private stadium (solid line).  Assuming the team played in a 40 
year-old public stadium to begin with, when it receives its new stadium, its franchise 
value realizes an approximate increase of $42,000,000.  As the stadium ages, the value of 
a team playing in a publicly-funded stadium falls (holding all other factors constant), 
while the value of a team playing in a privately funded-stadium increases, albeit at a very 
slow rate.  At 50 years of age, the team playing in a privately-funded stadium is only 
approximately $84,000,000 higher in value than the same team playing in a publicly-
funded stadium.  Since the owner can expect the team to have a franchise value at least 
equal to the value of the team in a public stadium, it is the difference between these 
values that provides the return from playing in a private stadium versus playing in a 
public stadium. 
According to Table 2, the 5 stadiums opened in 2000 or 2001 cost an average of 
$302,650,000 to construct.  Figure 2 provides a diagram showing the present value of the 
difference between a team playing in a privately funded stadium and one playing in a 
publicly funded stadium (discounted at a 1%, 5%, 7%, and 10% rate).  At a 1% discount 
rate, the present value of the difference is less than $55,000,000 (Panel 1).  At a 7% 
discount rate, the present value of the difference is less than $3,000,000 at 50 years of age 
(Panel 3).  At a 7% discount rate, the maximum present value of the difference is   21
approximately $15,600,000 at 13 years of age.  Even if the discount rate falls to 0, the 
present value of the difference never gets larger than $85,000,000, far below the cost of 
building the average new stadium opened in 2000 or 2001.  No rational profit-
maximizing team would want to spend $300,000,000 on a new stadium if it will not 
provide at least that much in marginal present value in return.  My results suggest that it 
will not. 
 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I examine the effect of the receipt of public funding for a new sports 
stadium on the franchise values of professional sports teams.  I argue theoretically that 
the receipt of a new stadium should increase the revenue generating capability of a team 
but the receipt of a new stadium could increase operating costs as well.  As long as the 
marginal costs are less than the marginal revenues, the franchise values of teams moving 
into new stadiums will be higher after the move. 
The empirical results suggest that regardless of the financing mechanism, a new 
stadium provides a boost to team franchise values.  If the team plays in a privately 
financed and privately owned stadium, the team’s franchise values increases over time.  
If the team plays in a publicly owned and publicly financed stadium, as the stadium ages, 
the team’s franchise value falls, all else equal.  However, the empirical results suggest 
that the difference in franchise values between playing in a privately-owned, privately 
financed stadium and playing in a publicly-owned, publicly financed stadium does not 
offset the cost of construction, even if team owners do not discount the future.  The paper   22
thus provides a deeper understanding of the motives behind the lobbying efforts of 
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Boston Red Sox Fenway Park 1912 $650,000* 0.0%
Chicago Cubs Wrigley Field 1914 $250,000* 0.0%
New York Yankees Yankee Stadium 1923 $2,500,000* 0.0%
L.A. Dodgers Dodger Stadium 1962 $136,904,762 17.0%
New York Mets Shea Stadium 1964 $147,398,844 100.0%
Anaheim Angels Anaheim Stadium 1966 $132,596,685 96.0%
St. Louis Cardinals Busch Stadium 1966 $138,121,547 80.0%
Oakand Athletics Network Associates Coliseum 1966 $140,883,978 100.0%
San Diego Padres Qualcomm Stadium 1967 $149,193,548 100.0%
Cincinnati Reds Cinergy Field 1970 $208,333,333 100.0%
Philadelphia Phillies Veterans Stadium 1971 $200,000,000 100.0%
Kansas City Royals Kauffman Stadium 1973 $283,400,810 100.0%
Minnesota Twins Hubert H Humphrey Metrodome 1982 $139,664,804 97.3%
Average (1962 - 1982) $167,649,831 89.0%
*Seasonally Adjusted CPI not available for 1912, 1914, and 1923
Table 1:  2002 Stadiums Built Before 1990








Chicago White Sox US Cellular Field 1991 $220,607,662 100.0%
Baltimore Orioles Oriole Park at Camden Yards 1992 $128,205,128 100.0%
Cleveland Indians Jacobs Field 1994 $212,378,641 48.0%
Texas Rangers Ameriquest Field 1994 $231,796,117 71.0%
Atlanta Braves Turner Field 1997 $263,157,895 100.0%
Seattle Mariners Safeco Field 1999 $558,963,283 66.0%
Houston Astros Minute Maid Park 2000 $261,233,020 68.0%
San Francisco Giants SBC Park 2000 $266,457,680 0.0%
Detroit Tigers Comerica Park 2000 $313,479,624 38.0%
Pittsburgh Pirates PNC Park 2001 $265,989,848 81.3%
Milwaukee Brewers Miller Park 2001 $406,091,371 78.0%
Average $284,396,388 68.2%
Table 2:  2002 Stadiums Opened 1990-2002
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Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Real Franchise Value 203000000 108000000
Real Per Capita Income 32629.35 4418.259
SMSA Population 4674193 3283690
Team Winning Percentage 501.2308 69.78258
Lagged Team Winning Percentage 499.8669 67.38866
Stadium Age 30.1716 24.40059
Age of Team 73.86391 40.58722
Tenure in City 57.97929 38.97374
Privately Owned Stadiums 0.204142 0.4036708
n 338
Table 3:  Summary Statistics  28
M o d e l 12345
Intercept 14.24374*** 14.7302*** 14.41158*** 14.43349*** 14.15988***
2.316335 2.359887 2.298477 2.306191 2.322058
Log of Real Per-capita Income 0.265987 0.2219265 0.2927276 0.2882827 0.2705483
0.2237044 0.2273032 0.2224856 0.2243932 0.2240027
Log of SMSA Population 0.1195067** 0.1175212** 0.0933814* 0.0946953* 0.1214541**
0.0565972 0.0562964 0.0542452 0.0543678 0.0566885
Winning Percentage 0.0006301*** 0.0006291*** 0.0006262*** 0.0006266*** 0.0006321***
0.0001118 0.0001119 0.0001111 0.0001114 0.000112
Lagged Winning Percentage 0.0004567*** 0.0004569*** 0.0004262*** 0.0004258*** 0.0004543***
0.0001101 0.0001102 0.00011 0.0001103 0.0001105
Stadium Age -0.0066157*** -0.0066522*** -0.0064038*** -0.0061522** -0.0059346**
0.0024173 0.0024154 0.0023721 0.0027639 0.0026941
Stadium Age Quadratic Term 0.0000566 0.0000571 0.000055 0.0000521 0.0000486
0.0000368 0.0000368 0.0000361 0.0000396 0.0000394
Age of Team -0.0078749 -0.0084358 -0.0067315 -0.0065908 -0.0067991
0.008824 0.0088047 0.0084813 0.0086247 0.0089635
Age of Team Quadratic Term 0.0000562 0.0000619 0.0000459 0.0000447 0.0000474
0.0000617 0.0000617 0.0000595 0.0000607 0.0000631
Years in City 0.0107296 0.0113765 0.0084322 0.0083586 0.0096521
0.0090703 0.0090512 0.0087611 0.0088631 0.0092031
Years in City Quadratic Term -0.0000743 -0.0000803 -0.0000591 -0.0000584 -0.0000658
0.0000634 0.0000634 0.0000614 0.0000623 0.0000647
Stadium Age - Private Financing 
Proportion Interaction
0.0038313 0.0029927 -0.0063556 -0.0064901 0.0031502
0.0048578 0.0049204 0.0056244 0.0056818 0.0049932
Stadium Age - Private Financing 
Proportion Interaction Quadratic 
Term
-0.00000833 0.0000284 0.0002156** 0.000217** -0.00000438
0.0000674 0.0000758 0.0000932 0.0000935 0.0000677
Sadium Age - Private Ownership 
Dummy Interaction
- -0.0025606 0.0185678*** 0.0177701*** -
0.0024065 0.0068171 0.0081222
Sadium Age - Private Ownership 
Dummy Interaction Quadratic Term
- - -0.0003337*** -0.0003258*** -
0.0001015 0.00011
Private Ownership Dummy - - - 0.0148966 0.0397416
0.0834405 0.0649171
Table 4
Dependent Variable:  Log of Real Team Franchise Value
 
Standard Errors are given below the parameter estimates 
*Table continued on next page  29
Table 4 – Continued 
d1990 -0.460214*** -0.4614644*** -0.4752323*** -0.4756602*** -0.4632025***
0.0670466 0.0670254 0.0655251 0.0658331 0.0671372
d1991 -0.5123435*** -0.5163667*** -0.5273889*** -0.5278817*** -0.5144807***
0.0674302 0.0675299 0.0660078 0.0663512 0.0674477
d1992 -0.621675*** -0.6254588*** -0.6364634*** -0.6367101*** -0.6231076***
0.0640277 0.0641266 0.0627313 0.0629591 0.0640003
d1993 -0.6419987*** -0.6465167*** -0.6566021*** -0.656945*** -0.6432963***
0.0630505 0.0632029 0.0618693 0.0621262 0.0630307
d1994 -0.669801*** -0.6745092*** -0.684053*** -0.6840455*** -0.6699663***
0.0598977 0.0600753 0.0588383 0.0589732 0.0598476
d1995 -0.6708641*** -0.6734981*** -0.6839827*** -0.6838305*** -0.6712524***
0.0564767 0.0565411 0.055485 0.0555908 0.0564406
d1996 -0.5548749*** -0.5569667*** -0.5669657*** -0.5667532*** -0.5551039***
0.0531188 0.0531702 0.0522666 0.0523633 0.0530949
d1997 -0.2170261*** -0.2181281*** -0.2285896*** -0.2286528*** -0.2181757***
0.0486774 0.0487061 0.0480031 0.0481319 0.0487047
d1998 -0.1457435*** -0.1454422*** -0.1575888*** -0.1574864*** -0.1468201***
0.0441055 0.0441243 0.0436636 0.0437573 0.0441521
d1999 -0.0899428** -0.0905437** -0.0930193** -0.0925096** -0.0889268**
0.0403738 0.0403942 0.0398616 0.0399865 0.0404302
d2000 -0.0418286 -0.0417888 -0.0482836 -0.047886 -0.0414406
0.034073 0.0340901 0.0337997 0.0339093 0.0341228
d2001 -0.0125282 -0.0121153 -0.0138845 -0.013824 -0.0126942
0.025077 0.0251029 0.0249624 0.0250201 0.0251307
R-sq:  Within 0.8007 0.7999 0.8089 0.8091 0.8027
R-sq:  Between 0.5651 0.5704 0.6158 0.6141 0.5565
R-sq:  Overall 0.7036 0.7084 0.7349 0.7343 0.7005
Number of Observations 338 338 338 338 338
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
(Ho:  Random effects not present):
397.00*** 393.06*** 369.59*** 347.81*** 397.75***
Hausman Test for Random Effects 
(Ho: individual effects uncorrelated 
with regressors)
8.97 11.06 8.05 20.3 11.45
Wooldridge Test for an AR1 Process 
(Ho:  No First-Order Autocorrelation 
Present
65.102*** 65.696*** 63.046*** 62.786*** 65.056***
*** significant at the 1% level or better
** significant at the 5% level up to but not including the 1% level
* significant at the 10% level up to but not including the 5% level  
Standard Errors are given below the parameter estimates   30
Figure 1




































Public to Private Public to Public
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Figure 2 
Panel 1
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i The assumption of perfect foresight is made for simplicity  
ii During 1990-2002, only one team played in a stadium that it partially owned:  the Milwaukee Brewers own 36% of Miller Park. 
iii The lease payment can take the form of a rental fee for the use of the building or it can come in the form of shared revenue where the team gives a proportion 
of its revenues generated during the year as payment for use of the stadium.  For example, the St. Louis Rams currently keep only 75% of the naming rights 
income for the dome in which they currently play (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
iv For simplicity, assume these costs do not occur until the team begins play in the new stadium. 
v Public subsidization comes in a variety of sources.  A government can subsidize the construction costs of building the structure (a construction subsidy), it can 
subsidize the costs of providing infrastructure around the building (an infrastructure subsidy), or it can simply give the team a transfer payment.  For simplicity, 
we focus on construction subsidies. 
vi There is a possibility that particular owners, in practice, may shy away from adding revenue-enhancing amenities for fear that they would induce increases in 
costs elsewhere, like player salaries.  Such behavior is assumed away for simplicity. 
vii This is based upon sale price and franchise value data obtained from Rod Fort’s website and supported by press articles obtained by the author from various 
web sources.  These results are available upon request by the author. 